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Abstract 
Sacconi and Grimalda (2002, 2005a, 2005b) introduced a model in which two basic motives 
to action are understood as different type of preferences and represented by a comprehensive 
utility function: the first is consequentialist motivation, whereas the second is a conditional 
willingness to conform with an ideal, or a moral principle, which they call a conformist, or 
ideal, motive to action. A moral ideal is meant as a normative principle of evaluation for 
collective modes of behaviours which provides agents with a ranking of states of affairs 
resulting from strategic interaction expressing a greater or lesser consistency with the ideal. 
The principle moreover is seen as resulting from a (possibly hypothetical) contract between 
the agents involved in the interaction in an ex-ante phase. Thus, the normative principle boils 
down to a social welfare function that measures the consistency of outcomes with the 
normative prescriptions provided by the ideal. Hence, agents understand their own and any 
other agent’s degree of conformity in terms of their contribution to carrying out the ideal 
given the others’ expected action, and a person’s own motivation to act in conformity with 
the principle increases with others’ (expected) conformity. In other words, individual 
conformity with the principle is conditional on others’ conformity with it, as perceived by 
the agent. This peculiar feature of reciprocity over others’ behaviour calls for an extension of 
the usual equipment of decision theory, which is provided by the theory of Psychological 
Games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989).  
In this paper we design an experiment for preliminary exploration of  the empirical 
validity of the conformist preferences model, applying it to a simple non cooperative game 
(the Exclusion Game) meant as the problem of dividing a sum between two active players 
and a third, dummy player (passive beneficiary). Results are encouraging. Behaviours 
dramatically change passing from the simple exclusion game to a three steps game, in which 
once the players have first played the typical non cooperative exclusion game, and  before 
playing it again, they participate in a middle phase, where they anonymously agree on a 
principle of division. Having agreed on a principle, even though this agreement does not 
implies reputation effects nor is externally enforceable, induces a substantial part of players - 
who acted selfishly in the first step - to conform to the principle in the third phase. The 
additional condition being that they believe the other players will also conform to the agreed  
principle (what here does happen, as a mater of fact). These results strictly accord with the 
prediction of the conformist preferences model, but cannot be accounted for by alternative 
theories of reciprocity.   
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1. Conformist preferences and the game of reference 
1.1 Background theory. 
Contrary to the economist’s fixation with the model of rational economic man seen as  
uniquely selfish utility maximiser, a more reasonable and realistic understanding of rational 
action suggests that individuals weight different, possibly conflicting, motives to act. On the 
hypothesis that economic agents are motivated both by consequentialist (and mainly self-
interested) and “conformist” preferences - that is the intrinsic motivation to act according to 
shared principles complied reciprocally by also the other interacting agents - Grimalda and 
Sacconi (2002, 2005a, 2005b) suggested that two classes of motives for choice can be grasped 
by two types of preferences of the Self and by their relative mathematical representation in the 
corresponding part of a comprehensive utility function. Thus, the utility maximisation model 
of rational economic man can be considerably revised, extending its explanatory and 
normative power at a substantial level.  In this paper we describe the results of an experiment 
designed to test the explanatory capacity of  Sacconi and Grimalda’s model of choice. This 
first subsection summarises the theory because it furnishes also the hypotheses for the 
experimental study reported  thereafter. 
The model assumes what we call a description relative view point of motives to act. The same 
states of affairs generated by strategic interaction can be described in different ways according 
to their relevant characteristics. A first description of states views them as consequences.  
Consequences may be described as attributed only to the acting Self - what happens to the 
decision-maker in any state. This description is the basis of Self-interest: the Self defines 
preferences over consequences, which are Self-referred. By contrast, consequences may be 
attributed to any person (extended consequences) in so far as they can be understood as 
consisting in what happens to any whatever individual. To make sense of any impartial 
consequentialist ethics like utilitarianism, or altruism,  consequences must be extended like 
that. In general, if a player defines his preferences only on states described as consequences, 
then he has consequentialist  personal preferences. 
The second type of preferences is what we call conformist personal preferences. Description 
of states is no less important here, but they are now described as sets of interdependent 
actions characterised in terms of whether or not they are consistent with a given abstract 
principle.  First, the principle can be captured by a function of individual first type utilities 
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attached to states which measures the fairness of welfare distribution in each state of the 
world. A pattern of behaviours (a vector of strategies) is defined as perfectly deontological if 
it is fully consistent with the abstract principle of fairness - that is, if it maximises the function 
just defined. We call this state the ideal. Hence, the fairness function generates an ordering of  
states in terms of their consistency to the principle.  Secondly,  we then determine the 
individual degree of conformity with the ideal relative to each strategy choice of any player 
by seeing whether and how much the ideal comes about through that choice of the player, 
given what he believes about other parties’ choices. Moreover the motivational weight of this 
conformity to the player himself depends on the expected reciprocal conformity of the other 
players given what they expect on the part of the first player. In fact, for each strategy 
combination, the intensity of each player’s conformist preference will depend on a measure of 
expected reciprocal conformity, which is based on:  
(a)  an index of the extent to which the player himself contributes to fulfilling the ideal by 
conforming with or deviating from it, given what he believes about the other player’s choice; 
(b)  an index of the extent to which the player believes that the other player contributes to 
fulfilling the ideal by conforming with or deviating from it, given what the second player 
believes (and the first player believes that the second player believes) that the first player will 
do. 
It follows that conformist preferences rest upon a measure of reciprocal conformity with the 
ideal, which on the other hand depends on a principle-based ordering of states according to a 
deontological property they possess. There is an indubitable relation between the two kinds of 
preferences -  consequentialist and conformist. In fact, in order to define fairness, we look at 
distributions of the payoffs deriving from the first type of preference – i.e. material utilities. 
But this does not reduce second-type preferences to first-type ones. First-type utilities are no 
more than rough materials for the criterion defining second-type preferences. What matters 
for the second description are not consequences or material payoffs as such, but a distributive 
property defined over payoffs, which is expressed by the function representing a principle of 
fairness. 
Thus characterisation of second-type preferences accords more with deontology than 
consequentialism. The more an expected state of affairs is consistent  with the ideal, the more 
an individual action belonging to it is preferred by a player (granted that the player  
contributes to generating the state and he expects that the other player reciprocally contribute 
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in the same way). Moreover, there is no reason to link deontology with a belief that there is 
some objective source of value  that has ontological reality “out there” (independently of the 
decision maker’s affections). In fact, while conformist preferences depend on degrees of 
deontology, deontology itself may nonetheless be  understood, as it is here, simply as 
individual compliance with a fair distribution principle that players could have rationally 
agreed in an ex ante hypothetical bargaining situation . 
Once these concepts have been translated into a formal model, a player’s comprehensive  
utility function consisting of two parts (which we assume to be separable), i.e. the 
representations of consequentialist and conformist preferences, can be defined as  
 
(1)   ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]σλσσ TfUV iii +=     
 
where Ui is the traditional player’s i “consequentialist” utility for state σ (a given strategy  
combination), the weight  λi  - which may be any positive real number -  is an exogenous 
psychological parameter that expresses how important the conformist component is within the 
motivational system of player i (we could call it the player’s i ‘maximum disposition to act 
according to conformist reasons’,  granted that certain conditions do apply), and f is a function 
representing reciprocal conformity with principle T which in turn is a function taking a value 
for each state  σ.  
First required is specification of a form of the fairness-function T which formally represents 
the ideal. This must be a mapping from the set of states (and first-order utilities attached to 
them) to a fairness ordering ranging over states. A characterisation in contractarian terms of 
the ideal principle T is given by the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. the Nash social welfare 
function N (or Nash product)  
 
   (2) ( ) ( ) ( )1
1
,...
N
N i i
i
T N U U U cσ
=
= = ∏ −  
 
where ci represents the reservation utility that agents can obtain when the process of 
bargaining breaks down. Second, as far as the function f is concerned, defined are two 
personal indexes of conformity, which will be compounded  in a measure of mutual expected 
conformity. It will and enter the utility functions of the players in so far as it will influence the 
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weight of the conformist motivation within the individuals system of preferences.1 In this 
construction we take the point of view of player i (any other player j’s perspective is 
symmetrical). 
Player i’s personal index  of conformity: 
This is player i‘s degree of deviation from the ideal principle T (which varies from 0 to –1), 
due to player i's choice, given her expectation about player j’s behaviour. It is normalised by 
the magnitude of difference between player i's full conformity and no conformity at all 
conditional on player j’s choice 
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where 1ib  is player i’s belief concerning player j’s action, ( )1iMAX bT   is the  maximum 
attainable by the function T given i’s belief, ( )1iMIN bT  is the minimum attainable by the 
function T given i’s belief, ( )1, ii bT σ  is the effective level attained by T when the player 
adopts  strategy σi, given his belief about the other player’s behaviour.  
Estimation function of the second player’s index of conformity  with the ideal:  
This is player j ‘s degree of deviation from the ideal principle T (which also varies from 0 to -
1), as seen through player i‘s beliefs - also normalised by the magnitude of difference between 
player j’s full conformity and no conformity at all, given what he believes (and player i 
believes that he believes) about player i's choice 
 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )22
221
21 ,
,
~
i
MIN
i
MAX
i
MAX
ii
iij bTbT
bTbbTbbf
−
−
=
 
 
where 1ib  is player i's  first order belief about player j’s action (i.e. formally identical to a 
strategy of player j), 2ib  is player i's second order belief about player j’s belief about the 
action adopted by player i (i.e. formally identical to a player i strategy  predicted by player j). 
                                                 
1
 Grimalda and Sacconi (2002) elaborate on Rabin (1993) in order to define the model of reciprocity.  
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These indexes are compounded to construct the following conformist component of the utility 
function 
(5) ( ) ( )2 1 11 , 1 ,i j i i i i if b b f bλ σ   + +     
 
From this formula we may state the following: if player i perfectly conforms with the ideal, 
given her expectation, while the player j is also expected to perfectly conform, then the two 
individual indexes take zero values, so that the resulting utility value due to conformism is λi. 
By contrast, if a player does not entirely conform, while not expecting the other player 
entirely to conform either, then the two indexes take negative values (possibly −1). Thus the 
utility calculation for conformist reasons reduces to (1−x)(1−y) (possibly both equal to zero) 
times the weight λi  and yields less than λi  (possibly  zero) as the conformist utility value. 
The comprehensive utility function Vi , hence, takes the form of the linear combination of the 
two components, with reference to each state described in terms of both the individual 
strategy choice and the individual beliefs system over the other player’s strategy choice (note 
that in equilibrium beliefs meet choices, so that a belief accurately describes what the other 
player does)  
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 1, , , 1 , 1 ,i i i i i i i i j i i i i iV b b U b f b b f bσ σ λ σ   = + + +     
 
This suggests that if a player predicts reciprocal conformism (so that conformist motivation  
effectively enters the utility function with weight λi ), as long as the weight λi is high enough, 
it is possible that the overall utility function reverses the preference for a strategy choice σi.  
with respect to the same player i’s simple consequentialist preferences represented by Ui(σi, 
bi). For example, it may induce the players to select strategies that they would never have 
chosen if they had relied on their material utility only.   
 
1.2. A reference situation: the Exclusion Game 
Conformist preferences account for ideal-driven choices based on the motivational force  of 
reciprocal conformity with impartial and impersonal abstract principles of fairness. Hence  it 
seems natural to use them in an attempt to explain behaviours such that a decision of fairly 
including a weak party in the sharing of benefits is taken by a group of strong players. The 
stylized situations of reference is one where “inclusion” is due not to the attitudes (or 
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intentions) expressed through effective interaction by the weak toward the strong parties 
(kindness, friendship, spontaneous cooperation and the like, which may affect their welfare 
position), but simply is a decision taken out of a sense of commitment. In other words strong 
players recognise an intrinsic value in reciprocating (amongst themselves) conformity with a 
principle of fairness. The typical situation is a social interaction between strong players and a 
weak player such that their mutual interaction makes a social surplus affordable, but only the 
strong players have decision influence over the allocation and distribution of the social 
surplus, whereas the weak party has neither a voice in this decision nor any retaliation threat 
at her disposal. Strong players can then decide to  include the weak player in the fair sharing 
of the surplus, or alternatively to exclude the weak player and share out the pie among 
themselves.  This is why we call this situation the “Exclusion Game”.  Of course, one should 
not forget the role of reciprocity. Nevertheless reciprocity in this case cannot have anything to 
do with “intentions” showed by the weak party, which in fact is so weak that it can be 
represented as a dummy player, i.e. a player with no move in the game, and hence incapable 
to show intention through actions. On the contrary reciprocity in conforming with a fairness 
principle works through the preferences of the group of players with decision influence and 
concerns their reciprocal conformity with the fairness ideal. Explanation of their inclusive 
behaviour does not involve any kindness, reciprocity, direct interaction or attitude whatsoever 
shown by the weak player toward the strong ones. In short, strong players’ inclusive 
behaviour is born out of a ‘sense of commitment’, it amounts  to ‘noblesse oblige’ . 
In order to give a formal description of the exclusion game, we consider a situation (a non-
cooperative game)  in which two individuals (player 1 and player 2) must decide how to 
allocate a sum of money R among themselves and a third individual (player 3), who does not 
have an active role in the allocation decision but whose payoff is determined by the choices 
made by the two other players (active players). In particular, active players can choose 
between two alternative strategies: first, asking for a large share of R, i.e. high demand, 
2
Rd hi = , which jointly amount to the whole pie; or second, asking for a small share of R, 
compatible with a fair distribution of the surplus, i.e. the low demand sRd li == 3  , with 
{ }2,1=i . The third player’s payoff is the remaining share of R after the two demands of the 
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active players have been met, i.e.  R – (d1 + d2). For example, in the case of low demand 
strategies by both the active players, the third player’s payoff is ( ) 321 RddRs ll =+−=  
 
 
Figure 1. The Exclusion Game. Payoff matrix 
  
 
 
ld 2  
hd 2  
ld1  
ld1 , 
ld 2 , s 
ld1 , 
hd 2 , s/2 
hd1  
hd1 , 
ld 2 , s/2 hd1 , hd 2 , 0 
 
As shown in figure 1, if both the active players decide to ask for half of the total sum R (high 
demand strategies), the third player’s payoff is zero; if one of the two active players decides 
to ask for only one third of R , while the other one chooses to ask for half of R, third player’s 
payoff is R/6. An equal division of R among all the players - including the dummy third 
player - (R/3 each), results when players 1 and 2 ask for only R/3. 
Given the assumption that player 3 is dummy, as far as we maintain that the players are 
motivated only by the intent to maximise their material payoffs, the only equilibrium in 
dominant strategies of this game is the one in which both active players choose to ask for 
2
Rd h = .  Thus, the Exclusion Game played by self-interested players will induce effective 
exclusion of the player with no influence on the allocation decision. This is only a preparatory 
move, however. The next section illustrates how matters changes when conformist 
preferences and reciprocity among the active players enter the picture..   
1.3 The exclusion game under conformist preferences and reciprocity.  
In order to apply the theory of conformist preferences to the Exclusion Game, we must first 
re-describe states of affairs resulting from the game in terms of their consistency to  the ideal 
of fairness formalised as the Nash bargaining solution (or Nash product)  (where it is assumed 
that the status quo is zero for each player). This we assume to be the principle of fairness 
agreed upon by all the players (active or otherwise) in an hypothetical (i.e. not externally 
enforceable) agreement.  
On applying the Nash product to the states resulting from the possible plays of our game we 
obtain the following  fairness ordering of  the four strategy combinations  
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(7)  d1ld2l  > d1hd2l =  d1ld2h  > d1hd2h 
 
based on 
  
( ) ( ) sddddNddT llllllMAX 212121 ,, ==  
(8) ( ) ( ) ( ) RsddddNsddddNddT hlhllhlhlh 2,2,, 21212121 ====  
  
( ) ( ) 00,, 2121 === hhhhhhMIN ddddNddT  
 
We can use these values to compute the overall utility values on the basis of the conformity 
indexes for each pair of actions and for the relative beliefs. In this new context the appropriate 
notion of equilibrium is that of Psychological Nash Equilibrium (Geanakoplos et al. (1989)2), 
which is an extension of the Nash equilibrium for situations in which expectations enter the 
player’s utility function. 
Accordingly, given the players utilities defined as function of their beliefs, we can easily 
compute the psychological equilibria of the game played by agents with conformist 
preferences. Strategy combinations that were not Nash equilibria in the basic game can now 
be defined as psychological equilibria. In particular, ( ll dd 21 , ) is a psychological equilibrium 
once it is granted that the weights  λi  are sufficiently high:   
 
(9) ( ) ( ) lhlllll dddbdbVdbdbdV 1111212111112121111 ,,,, −>⇔==>== λσ  
(10) ( ) ( ) lhlllll dddbdbVdbdbdV 2222221122122211222 ,,,, −>⇔==>== λσ  
 
Put otherwise: given the vector of strategies ( ll dd 21 , ), every player i ‘s overall utility from 
strategy lid  - assuming a system of mutually consistent beliefs according to which each player 
predicts with probability 1 the symmetric strategy ld  by the opponent - is greater than the 
overall utility gained by deviating to the alternative strategy hid , and this holds 
simultaneously true for both the active players. In our example this condition is satisfied when 
the weight of conformist preferences λi compensates for the loss of material utility deriving 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix 1 for details. 
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from the decision to comply with the ideal. Under these conditions there exists a 
psychological equilibrium of the game such that  players 1 and 2 choose to ask for the lowest 
share of the total sum that guarantees an equal distribution of R among all three players. Thus, 
one of the equilibrium solutions of the psychological Exclusion Game is the effective 
inclusion of the third inactive party in the sharing of the surplus. In the event that players have 
strong preferences for reciprocal conformity with the hypothetical social contract ideal of 
fairness, and if they have consistent reciprocal beliefs in that regard, a solution may be 
inclusion, not exclusion.   
Note, however, that this strategy combination is not the only equilibrium of the game: also 
( hh dd 21 , ) is a psychological equilibrium when a system of beliefs exists such that both player 1 
and 2 predict with probability 1 that nobody will conform with the principle, in that they have 
higher-order beliefs coherent with this expectation. In particular, if player 1 believes that the 
opponent will choose the worst action with regard to the moral principle (first order belief), 
and if he also believes that player 2 believes that 1 will choose the same action (second order 
belief), neither the opponent nor player 1 have incentives to respect the moral principle by 
acting against their material self-interest. 
In the following sections, after having introduced the experimental design and procedure (sec. 
2), we will show (sec.3) how this model can be used to formulate predictions about the 
choices made by subjects involved in the experiment.  
2. Experimental design and procedure 
The experiment took place at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(CEEL) of the University of Trento and it consisted  of six sessions with 15 subjects, for a 
total of 90 participants.3  Each subject received a show-up fee of  € 5 for participation. 
Each session was divided into three phases and lasted one hour on average.  
In phase one the subjects played a version of the Exclusion Game. They were assigned to 
groups composed of three members. Within each group, subjects were randomly attributed the 
roles of G1 and G2 and G3. G1 and G2 were invited to play a game in which they had to 
decide how to allocate a sum of money (S= €12) between themselves and the third player, 
who did not have any active role in the game. In particular, active players were able to decide 
                                                 
3
 Participants were all students at the University of Trento (mainly from economics, law and sociology courses), 
recruited by responding to ads posted at the various departments. 
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how much of the sum to ask for themselves (d1, d2), selecting one of three possible strategies: 
25%, 33% or 50% of S. Active players’ payoffs corresponded to d1 and d2, while the third 
player’s payoff was  S-(d1+d2) (Figure 2).  
The subjects played the game three times, in three different rounds. At the beginning of each 
round the three roles were randomly assigned to the members of the group. The selection 
mechanism was designed so that each player was able to take each of the three roles G1, G2 
and G3 in turn. The subjects were told that at the end of the experiment the software would 
extract  one of these three rounds at random, and the player’s earning for phase 1 would be 
determined according to the outcome of that round.4 The game was played anonymously and 
subjects were not aware of the previous rounds’ outcome. This procedure produced two 
observations for each player in this phase: his choice in the G1 role and his choice in the G2 
role. That is for each player we have two rounds of observable choice at phase one. 
 
Figure 2. The experimental Exclusion Game. Payoff matrix 
G2  
3 (25%) 4( 33%) 6 (50%) 
3(25%) 3,3, ( 6 ) 3, 4, ( 5 ) 3, 6, ( 3 ) 
4(33%) 4, 3, ( 5 ) 4, 4, ( 4 ) 4, 6, ( 2 ) G1 
6(50% 6, 3, ( 3 ) 6, 4, ( 2 ) 6, 6, ( 0 ) 
 
In phase two the subjects were assigned to new groups consisting of three anonymous 
members. Without definition of roles, they were invited to agree upon an hypothetical rule for 
the allocation of a sum between two active players and one non-active player by means of a 
voting procedure. The agreement was to be reached by repeatedly playing the voting 
procedure until unanimity was reached, within a given limit of trials. No explicit 
communication was allowed among the players of any given group. In particular, after they 
were informed that in the following phase they would play a game like the one played in the 
                                                 
4 This is an application of the procedure known as random lottery incentive system (Starmer and Sugden (1991) and 
Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden (1998)). Adopting this procedure, the round in which the subject has played in the G1 
or G2 role is selected with a probability of 2/3, which is the same probability of being extracted as G1 or G2 in a 
one-shot version of the game.  Note that, if we look at the third phase of the experiment, using this mechanism we 
can always  compare the choice of each of the players that in that phase have an active role with his choice in the 
first phase.  
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first phase, they were requested to vote for one of two general principles and one among some 
more specific rules deduced from the selected general principle (Figure 3). Subjects were told 
that groups which reached unanimous agreement by voting for the same principle within five 
trials would pass to the voting on the specific allocation rule, upon which the groups had to  
agree within ten trials. A lack of unanimity after the last of the trials would prevent subjects 
from entering the third phase. 
At the beginning of this phase the experimenters informed the subjects about the voting 
procedure, stressing the correspondence between the specific rules and the game strategies of 
phases one and three. Absolute anonymity was guaranteed and the subjects were not allowed 
to communicate throughout the procedure.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In phase three, with the composition of the group unchanged, G1, G2 and G3 roles were 
randomly assigned to the members of each group that agreed upon a given principle. 
The subjects were involved in the same game as in the first phase, but now active players had 
the additional option of choosing between implementing the rule that they had agreed in the 
second phase or choosing one of the alternative strategies. If a player decided to implement 
the rule, then the corresponding strategy would be automatically selected, otherwise the 
strategy would be removed from his strategy set. Thus, for example, if player i was part of a 
group that in the second phase had reached agreement on rule 1.2 in figure 3 and if in phase 
three, playing the role of G1, he decided to implement that rule, then strategy ‘4’ was 
automatically selected. 
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 See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the voting procedure. 
PRINCIPLE 1. 
Every player should share the 
benefits, in particular, who has 
not the possibility to choose 
should not receive less then 
PRINCIPLE 2. 
People who play under a 
decisional role could 
claim a higher share of 
benefits. 
    G1      G2      G3 
1.1  33%     25%     42% 
1.2  25%     33%     42%  
1.3  33%     33%     33%  
    G1      G2      G3 
2.1  50%     25%     17% 
2.2  33%     50%     17%  
2.3  50%     50%      0  
Figure 3: Second phase. Principles and rules  
P
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Just after their choice, active players were asked to express their expectation about the 
opponent’s behaviour by guessing the outcome of the game.6 Data on the number of subjects 
that chose to implement the rule were collected and communicated to active players, who 
were asked to play again, in the same roles, using the same procedure as adopted at the 
beginning of the third phase, without knowing the outcome of the previous game. 
At the end of the third phase, earnings were computed and players were paid. The total 
earning corresponded to the payoff of the extracted round of the first phase plus the payoff of 
the two games played in the third phase. 
Then subjects were asked to fill out a short questionnaire on their explanation for doing 
certain decisions during the experiments.  (see appendix 4).  
A scheme of the experimental procedure is given in figure 4. The correspondence between the 
structure of the theory under control and the experimental design should be clear. In the first 
phase players enter the game without being able to agree upon a general principle of division.  
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 We asked  the player to indicate the cell of the payoff matrix in which he thought the game would end. In this 
way we avoided explicitly asking for his opinion about the opponent’s willingness to conform with the rule. 
 
 
 
VOTING 
GENERAL PRINCIPLE 
 
VOTING SPECIFIC RULE 
( MAX. 10 TRIALS) 
 
 
 
 
 
ROUND 1 
Within each group: 
- G1, G2 and G3 roles are assigned. 
- G1 and G2 play the game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G1, G2 AND G3 
ROLES ARE 
ASSIGNED 
G1 AND G2 PLAY  FIRST 
TIME  THE GAME 
(IMPLEMENT THE RULE 
OR ALTERNATIVE 
STRATEGIES) 
PREDICTION  
BY G1 AND G2 
DATA ON % OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE RULE 
PREDICTION  
BY G1 AND G2 
Figure4. The experimental procedure 
SUBJECTS ARE DIVIDED INTO 5 GROUPS 
OF 3 MEMBERS EACH. 
SUBJECTS ARE DIVIDED 
INTO 5 GROUPS OF 3 
MEMBERS EACH. 
ROUND 2 
Within each group: 
- G1, G2 and G3 roles are assigned. 
- G1 and G2 play the game 
ROUND 3 
Within each group: 
- G1, G2 and G3 roles are assigned. 
- G1 and G2 play the game 
PHASE 1  
PHASE 2  
PHASE 3 (WHITIN EACH GROUP) 
G1 AND G2 PLAY  SECOND  
TIME  THE GAME 
(IMPLEMENT THE RULE OR 
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES) 
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The second phase corresponds to the “constitutional” step. Here the players can agree on both 
a general principle and a specific rule for the division of the sum. Note that one of the rules, 
the (33%, 33%, 33%) one, corresponds to the outcome of the game in which the Nash welfare 
function is maximised.  
Playing this phase does not produce  payoffs as such, because it only involves agreement on 
the rule that may be used to resolve a game later on, when the players will again have 
complete freedom of choice relative to the strategy to be implemented. However failure in the 
constitutional process is costly, because it prevents players from accessing the last phase, in 
which they can earn an additional sum of money. 
The choice between the two principles should not be interpreted as simply a choice between 
moral conduct and pure amoral, and intrinsically censurable, self-interested behaviour. In fact, 
the inclusionist and exclusionist principles have been presented as if they express two 
alternative, but nevertheless admissible, positions. In the case of inclusion, the allocation of 
the benefits is assumed to be independent of the active role played by the subjects in the game 
(i.e. it sees as morally inapprorpiate as a basis for  judgent whether the player holds the  
power to exclude or not); in the case of exclusion, the principle of equal distribution takes as 
relevant the active roles in the interaction and hence it is appliyed only within the acive 
players set.7   
In the third phase, the same players, after they have reached agreement on a division rule, are 
again involved in the Exclusion Game for two times. First they can choose whether or not to 
implement the rule they agreed. They are completely free to make a decision contrary to their 
previous agreement on a rule. In fact, even though agreement has been reached, at this stage 
its benefits are over, and the subjects are asked to look forward to the exclusion game  as a 
new phase of the experiement.  Hence, if the subjects have purely consequentialistic 
orientation they will forget everything about the agreed principles or rules, and will 
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concentrate on the possible outcomes of the exclusion game understood simply as 
consequences (material payoff). Otherwise considering the agreed principles and rules (and 
beliefs about compliace by other players) clearly denotes a deontological orientation. Asking 
the players about their expectations concerning the outcome of the game enabled us to deduce 
the players’ beliefs about the opponent’s willingness to conform with the rule. Finally, by 
asking the subjects to play the game again, after they had been told the percentage of people 
who had decided to implement the rule, we wanted to test the effect of such information on 
the players’ beliefs and choices.  
3. Empirical predictions and results. 
3.1 Empirical predictions 
What should we expect the results of the experiment to be if we assume that the players had 
conformist preferences?   
The answer to this question is provided by direct application of the model presented in section 
1.1. We begin by applying the Nash bargaining function to the outcomes of the game used in the 
experiment (2). Figure 5 reports the ‘fairness values’ given by the function in correspondence to 
the various states resulting form playing each strategy combination of the game . 
 
 Figure 5. Application of model to the Exclusion game. 
Nash welfare function values. 
 
 3 4 6 
3 54 60 54 
4 60 64 48 
6 54 48 0 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
  One could criticise our decision not to sharpen the moral distinction between the self-interested rule of conduct 
and the other-regarding rule of conduct. On the other hand, were the choice framed as one between a moral 
principle and an amoral behaviour at all some reader would have been right in suggesting that we could have 
induced the subjects’ choice  by means of some interiorised cultural norm, not letting then to be free in agreeing 
on the constitutional principle they see more fit for this situation.  
To sum up, those who chose the ‘only-the-active-players-have-a-legitimate-claim-to-a-share-of-the-pie’ principle 
showed to adhere to a sort of ‘moral egoism’ based on the intuition that only having effective influence on the 
result legitimise a claim (something like ‘to whichever according to his power’). On the other hand those who 
chose the ‘equal division’ principle realised that being one of the participants in the choice over the constitution 
taken under a veil of ignorance concerning whether a player will be active or dummy, which will allows, once 
agreed, to proceed to play the division game, legitimise an equal claim on the final distribution no matter the 
random selection (by a natural lottery) of the role the players will take later on.  
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Hence, from the conformity indexes attached to each outcome of the game, we can compute 
the individual comprehensive utility values, assuming that in each state the players’ beliefs 
reciprocally predict exactly the strategy chosen by the opponent.   These values are reported 
in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Application of the conformist preferences model to 
the Exclusion game. Payoff matrix. 
 
 3 4 6 
3 3,3 14
33 λ+ , 22
34 λ+
 3,6 
4 12
34 λ+ , 24
33 λ+
  14 λ+ , 24 λ+  4,6 
6 6,3 6,4 6,6 
 
As one can see, if 1λ >6-4 = 2 then player 1 will prefer strategy ‘4’ to strategy ‘6’, and the 
same holds for player 2. Thus the strategy combination (4, 4) is a psychological equilibrium if 
iλ >2 and if the players’ reciprocal beliefs are coherent with these strategies.  But if player 1 
believes that player 2 will not choose the strategy that produces the outcome closest to the 
ideal one, he will do the same, choosing strategy ‘6’. Because the same holds for player 2, the 
strategy combination (6, 6) is a psychological equilibrium as well. It follows that together the 
choice of the principle that may enter their indexes of conformity influencing the motivating 
force of conformism, empirical prediction about the solution of the game will depend upon 
what we can say about the combination of the players’ reciprocal beliefs and the absolute 
weight of the conformist disposition. 
In phase 1, players have no information about the type of their opponents, nor can they refer 
to any pre-existing agreement about the way in which the game should be played. Thus, there 
is no basis for conformist preferences (there is no agreed principle to comply with nor any 
reason to expect compliance by the counterpart). Even though the players could in principle 
have a high level of iλ , this weight simply remains inactive.  We should therefore expect 
players, even those with high conformist disposition, to believe that their opponents will 
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choose the strategy that maximises their own self-material interest, and consequently will ask 
for € 6 (50% of S). 
 
 Prediction 1.  In phase one, the choices of  players motivated by conformist preferences will 
not be different from the choices of self-interested players. We will consequently find  that 
they choose strategy ‘6’. 
 
In the second phase players must choose a rule on how to play an hypothetical Exclusion 
Game that may be played at a later moment. They know that if they are able to agree upon 
some principle of division, they will be able to play the Exclusion Game later, even though 
they do not yet know in what role they will play it again. This is typically a constitutional 
perspective. Such a perspective allows for the choice of general principles and rules of 
behaviour, incorporating a view of fairness. According to a contractarian approach to the 
constitutional choice of principles, players will take an impartial perspective: that is, they will 
judge the outcomes of the game from the point of view of each of the three roles in turn, and 
then choose a principle and a rule acceptable from whichever point of view. This implies a 
solution that must be invariant to the permutation of the individual points of view, that is, 
equal distribution of the surplus - if it is available within the payoff set -  given what is 
claimed as baseline by every player in the constitutional choice. Note that within the 
“cooperative payoff space” defined by the Exclusion Game, rational bargaining according to 
the Nash bargaining solution would select the ‘equal division’ outcome (in coherence to the 
‘invariance to symmetries’ and the Pareto postulates, granted the status quo is zero). 
In this setting, ‘equal distribution’ is also an intuitively obvious choice, i.e. one with high  
‘salience’. Given that agreement in this phase is a necessary condition for accessing the third 
phase, players may vote for the most salient rule to co-ordinate their choices in a limited 
number of trials. Salience, of course, may depend on the simplicity of the symmetric 
distribution; on the other hand, cognitive simplicity may also be connected to the fairness of 
equal division. Whether the cognitive simplicity or the intuitive fairness of a symmetric 
distribution comes first is difficult to say. We are here tempted to say that the cognitive and 
ethical features of symmetry are quite interlocked.  
However, we must remind that available to conformist players at this step is also an 
agreement over the ‘the powerful players get all the pie’ principle, which notwithstanding its 
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crudeness is a possible second principle of division. Hence, we cannot uniquely predict that 
conformist players will choose the equal division principle. Conformity enters the picture 
only once a principle has been chosen in the constitutional phase, whereas the nature of the 
specific principle chosen depend on the proper understanding of the contractarian nature of 
the constitutional phase, which is independent of conformity per se. (We might say that also a 
constitutional choice of the “egoist” principle, even though it may reflect a misunderstanding 
of the symmetry of the contractarian choice, once it were made and conformed to,  would be  
consistent with the model of conformist preferences). Thus we can only predict from our 
normative model of the constitutional nature of the decision phase over  principles, that the 
equal division principle will have some intuitive force. Note that this is also a methodological 
necessity if the experiment must be able to test in effective way the hypothesis of conformist 
preferences. In fact, should conformist players - which at the first step decided to act out of 
their simple self-interest - decide at the second step uniquely to agree over “the powerful take 
all the pie” principle, and then going on by deciding to comply with this principle, then no 
evidence of change in the players’ behaviours could be observed through the experiment, 
since self-interest and conformity would dictate the same behaviour.  No falsification could be 
provided this way against the conformist hypothesis. On the other hand, if a significant share 
of players, who made a selfish choice at the first phase, subscribe to an equal division 
principle at the second phase, then we have a clear empirical basis against which conformist 
theory can be tested. We have simply to see whether the mere fact of a ‘constitutional’ 
agreement over rules  - which opens the door to the opportunity to play again a beneficial 
division game at phase two - is capable to activate motivational forces that will drive players 
to conform with the agreed principle (granted that players entertain the appropriate beliefs), 
changing their conduct with respect to how the behaved in the first phase.8 Thus, our second 
prediction is crucial to the falsification  power of our experiment.   
 
Prediction 2. In phase two, a rule that assigns equal payoffs to all the players will be chosen 
by a significant  part of the participants.  
 
                                                 
8
 Note that this implies that only a subset of the observations consistent with the theory may have crucial 
discriminating force amongst different theoretical hypotheses over  rational action, and we mainly are interested 
to produce exactly this kind of evidence. This would have justified us also in stressing a bit more the ethical 
nature of the second phase decision in order to test the level of conformism in the third phase.   
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Assume that the players have now reached phase three. Hence they must have been able to 
agree on the same principle and rule. If this is enough for them to believe that a chosen 
principle and rule will also be played by the other players who have agreed on the same 
principle and rule, then their reciprocity-based conformist preferences will be activated (both 
deviations from conformity indexes are close to zero), granted that exogenous weights 
attached  to non material motivations are significant. Hence, a conformist player will comply 
with the principle and the rule. If we hypothesize that the exogenous weight of conformist 
motivation is a psychological feature widespread in the population, and granted that we 
predict that a significant part of the players will have chosen an equal division rule, then we 
must expect a significant number of them to choose strategy ‘4’. What is most important, 
however, is that, if the players are conformist,  we must expect the largest part of those who 
agreed on the equal division principle and rule to comply with the rule in the third phase, if 
we have some evidence that they believe that the rule will be followed by the others. 
Moreover, if these players are told that most of the players implement the principle and the  
rule (in a way that backs the relevant belief), then, if they are truly conformist, they will be 
more motivated to play in accordance with the principle and the rule themselves.  
Prediction 3. Players with conformist preferences who (having agreed on a rule) predict an 
outcome of the game compatible with a belief about the opponent’s willingness to implement 
the agreed rule, will implement the rule as well. 
 
Prediction 4.  Given predictions 2 and 3, a significant part of players (endowed with 
conformist preferences) will request ‘4’. Moreover most of the player (endowed with 
conformist preferences) who behaved according to prediction 2 and satisfy prediction 3, will 
request ‘4’ in the third phase.  
 
Prediction 5. Once conformist players learn that a large part of the players that have chosen 
the rule acted in accordance with predictions 3 and 4, they will continue to request ‘4’ 
thereafter. 
3.2 Alternative predictions 
Let us now ask what kind of results can be expected from application of models based on a 
different characterisation of players’ motivational complexity. Before we discuss the 
experimental results, we will answer this question by briefly considering two alternative 
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approaches: the  “inequity aversion”  theory devised by  Fehr and Schmidt (1999)  and the  
model of reciprocity introduced by Rabin (1993). 
3.2.1 Inequity aversion in the Exclusion Game 
The idea at the basis of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model is that agents suffer from both 
advantageous and (to a greater extent) disadvantageous inequality. Mathematically, given n 
players, the utility function of player i is: 
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where αi and βi are the weights of utility losses from disadvantageous (αi) and  advantageous 
(βi) inequality, with   ii αβ ≤ and     10 <≤ iβ . 
Predictions about the solution of the Exclusion Game depend on the players with whom each 
active player compares his/her payoff. If s/he cares only about the other active player, the 
unique Nash equilibrium of the game  is the one in which both the active players request € 6. 
But, if the third player’s payoff  enters the utility function of the active players, then (4,4) is a 
Nash equilibrium if 3/221 >= ββ .9  
However, the distinguishing feature of this model is that according to it there should be no 
differences at all between the way the game is played in the first phase and the way it is 
played in the third phase of the experiment. In other words, phase 2 is irrelevant to this model. 
3.2.2 Reciprocity in the Exclusion Game  
Rabin (1993) conceives a model of choice in which the agent’s utility depends both on his 
material payoff ( ipi ) and on a measure of reciprocal kindness ( Rabin, 1993 :1286-1287 ). In 
particular, player i  judges his own kindness if toward j, given his strategy ia  and his beliefs 
jb  about j ‘s strategy, as the distance between the payoff he gives to j and an equitable payoff 
– which is  defined as the average between the maximum and the minimum payoffs that he 
                                                 
9
 The strategy vector  (4,4) is a Nash equilibrium if 
111 364)2,4,6()4,4,4( β−>⇔> uu  
and  
222 364)2,6,4()4,4,4( β−>⇔> uu  
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could give to j. Kindness of j toward i (defined as 'if ) , given i’s beliefs about j’s beliefs about 
i's strategy ( ic ), is measured as the difference between the payoff that j  gives to i  and the 
equitable payoff (calculated like before).  
The utility function of player i is given by 
 
,
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Note that if i  perceives the action by j as not kind, he will gain utility by reacting with an 
unkind action, while if he perceives tj’s choice as kind, he will gain utility by reciprocating 
with a kind action. Given these preferences,  and using the tools of psychological game 
theory,  Rabin introduces the concept of fairness equilibrium, which is defined by a vector of 
strategies which are mutually best responses to each other and by a set of beliefs compatible 
with those strategies (Rabin; 1993: 1288). 
Rabin provides a theoretical framework that has also proved very useful in developing the 
model of choice subject to the experimentation described here (Grimalda and Sacconi 2002, 
2005). To be noted, however, is that the basic difference between the notions of fairness 
incorporated into the indexes of ‘conformity’ (Sacconi and Grimalda) or ‘kindness’ (Rabin) 
used by the two theories respectively generates a sharp difference in the players’ expected 
behaviours in our experimental game. Assuming Rabin’s model of  motivation we would 
predict (6,6) as the unique fairness equilibrium of the Exclusion Game, both in phase one and 
three. To see this, consider the fact that in the Exclusion Games active players are the 
dictators in a standard Dictator Game. Each of them is endowed with a sum of R/2 and has to 
decide how much of that sum to give to the third player; but his own payoff  does not depend 
upon the action of the other active player. As a consequence, the two kindness measures are 
both equal to zero.  
 This is due to the fact that what Rabin understands to be fairness is in fact a direct and 
reciprocal attitude of kindness shown by the actions that players undertake directly toward 
each other and vice versa. This is a personal relationship and a personally orientated attitude. 
By contrast, the model of conformist preferences is based on an impersonal and impartial 
principle of fairness chosen under an hypothesis of symmetry and exchangeability of personal 
places, which must be applied to whichever player is affected by the real game in whatever 
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role only because he may have been party to the constitutional of choice of rules. In so far as 
impersonality and impartiality of the principle (rule) are distinctive of this approach, it can be 
called a theory of ‘ideal preferences’ based on ‘ethical principles of fairness’. For the same 
reason, it is doubtful that ‘fairness’ (a typical ethical concept) is the true feature of Rabin’s 
model - which can be more properly understood as a ‘kindness’ model (where kindness is a 
feature of direct personal relationships)   
The same prediction – both active players will choose strategy ‘6’ - would derive from the 
application of any other model where ‘intentionality’ is construed as an attitude (in the 
player’s action) directed toward another player, who then perceives the intention of the 
opponent’s action as being to generate a favourable or unfavourable consequence specifically 
to himself, like a manifestation of kindness, friendship or hostility  - that is, any model based 
on the idea that a player‘s choice is influenced by the perceived intentions of the opponent 
directed toward the player himself and by the willingness to react to these intentions - see for 
example Falk and Fischbacher, 2001.10)  
3.3 Results11 
3.3.1 General description of behaviours 
We begin with a general description of the subjects’ behaviour. In order to be clear, let us 
remind that each subject plays two rounds of the game in phase 1, and then (if he is not 
selected to be a dummy player) he plays again twice (we call these  ‘times’) the basic game in 
phase three.  In the first phase subjects played once in the G1 role and once in the G2 role. 
Considering all the 90 subjects involved in the three sessions (Figure 712), we observed that a 
large majority of players (54.4%) chose to ask for six euros when playing in both the G1 and 
G2 roles, leaving nothing for the third player.  
                                                 
10 It should be noted that this is not the only way intentionality can be construed: typically we say that 
deontological reasoning is based on intention and not on consequences, because it is driven by the ‘nature’ 
(rightness or wrongness) of the action itself, without any reference to its consequences for anybody. Rightness or 
wrongness are typically decided in terms of the consistency of actions with some abstract moral principle. In this 
case intentionality is expressed by the desire to act according with an impersonal and impartial principle or - to 
say it differently - the intention to act rightly, without any consideration of the consequence resulting to any 
potential player whatsoever. 
 
11
 See  Appendix 3 for the complete dataset. 
12
 The two numbers represent the choices made in the G1 and G2 roles respectively. 
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Figure 7: Players' choice in phase 1 (n=90)
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About one third of the subjects made different choices in the two symmetrical roles G1 and 
G2, choosing to ask for 6 euros as G1 (G2) and 4 euros as G2 (G1). Although we cannot 
completely exclude the possibility of confusion, a look at the questionnaires suggests that this 
particular behaviour can be explained mostly in terms of regret, which induced subjects to 
adjust, in the second round, the choice made  in the first round. 
 
Jumping for a moment to phase three, it will be seen that some players were assigned the role 
of the dummy player.  As a consequence, because they never played during this phase, their 
behavior cannot be compared with their behaviour in the first phase. The remaining players 
instead took an active role in both rounds of the third phase. Hence, if we want to compare the 
results of  phase one and phase three, we must limit our analysis to the 60 subjects that played 
in G1 or G2 in this phase (Figure 8).13  
 
Figure 8: Active players' choices in phase I and phase III (n=60)
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13 With regard to phase three, two numbers represent the choices at  time 1 and at time 2  respectively. 
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Three main facts emerge from comparison between the two distributions: first, moving from 
phase 1 to phase 3 there is a significant growth of the share of subjects who asked for 4 euros 
at both the first and the second time they played in phase 3. Second, the percentage of 
subjects that chose to keep the maximum amount for themselves (6 euros) in both the rounds 
of the first phase did not greatly differ from the percentage of players who decided to ask for 
6 euros in both the two rounds of  the third phase. Finally, we can observe a shift from the 
unimodal distribution of the first phase’s choice to the clearly bimodal distribution of the 
choices of the third phase, in which only a negligible number of subjects asked for different  
amounts in the two rounds. Table 1 gives a more detailed picture of  this polarization between 
the “4,4” and the “6,6” choices.14 
 
Table 1. Choices in phase I and III ( N=60) 
  Phase III 
   3-3 3-4 4-3 4-4 4-6 6-4 6-6   
3-3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3-4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
4-3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
4-4 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 6 
4-6 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 8 
6-4 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 9 
Ph
as
e 
I 
6-6 0 0 0 12 1 1 20 34 
   0 0 0 25 1 1 33 60 
 
                                                 
14
  To test whether a difference exists between the choices in phase 1 (before agreement on the rule) and those in 
phase three (after agreement on the rule) we can distinguish between equity oriented choices, corresponding to 
“Class E= ask for ‘4’ at least once, but do not ask for ‘6’ ” and more self-interest-oriented choices, 
corresponding to “Class S= asks for ‘6’ at least once”. We can  introduce the  null hypothesis that the number of 
subjects that move from Class E to Class S is the same as the number of subjects moving from Class S to Class 
E.  
 
 
 PHASE III  
 E S  
E 6 3 9 
PH
A
SE
 
I 
S 19 32 51 
  25 35 60 
 
On looking at the joint distribution of frequency,  we can reject the null hypothesis that the probabilities of being 
in cells [S,E] and [E,S] are the same (McNemar’s Chi-squared =10,22, df=1, p-value=0,0013). 
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3.3.2 Choice and implementation of the division rule 
Inspection of the data in phase two, when the subjects are requested to agree over a principle 
and a division rule,  shows that 19 of the 30 groups (57 subjects) chose principle 1 and rule 
(33%, 33%, 33%), 10 groups ( 30 subjects) chose principle 2 and rule (50%, 50%, 0%) and 
only one group (3 subjects) chose principle 2 and rule ( 50%, 33%, 17%). 
Unanimity on a general principle for each group was reached within a maximum of three  
trials,  with a large majority of groups reaching agreement in the first trial. The maximum 
number of trials required to reach unanimous agreement on a specific division rule was 
seven,15  but most groups did not go beyond the first trial.  
With regard to active players, 24 of the 38 who chose the (33%, 33%, 33%) rule decided to 
implement it at both times they played in the third phase. Rule (50%, 50%, 0%) was 
implemented by 19 of the 20 active players belonging to the groups that selected that rule 
(Table 2).  Only one of the two members with an active role , who agreed on the (50%, 33%, 
17%) rule, decided to implement it at both times of third phase (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Division rule choice and implementation (Active players; N=30) 
RULE N. Implementation 
of the rule at first 
time (freq.) 
Belief  about 
other’s 
conformity 
(time I) 
(freq.) 
Implementation 
of the rule at 
second time 
(freq.) 
Beliefs about 
other’s conformity  
(time 2) 
(freq.) 
Implementation of 
the rule in both  
time 1 and  2 
(freq.) 
{33%, 33%, 33%} 38 25 23 25 24 24 
{50%, 50%, 0%}. 20 19 19 19 19 19 
{50%, 33%, 17%}. 2 1 1 1 0 1 
TOT. 60 45 43 45 43 44 
 
At both times of phase three, almost all the players that implemented the rule (both the rules) 
predicted an outcome of the game compatible with reciprocal conformity. On the other hand, 
                                                 
15
  Reached only by the members of the group that agreed on the (50%, 33%, 17%) rule. 
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almost all the players who decided not to conform with the rule predicted that their opponents 
would do the same (see Appendix 3 for details). 
Forty four players (73%) made correct predictions about the willingness of the opponent to 
conform with the rule. As shown by the data, information about the percentage of players that 
chose to implement the rule the first time, had no effect on their choice at the second time of 
this phase. It is not troubling  however, in that this information largely confirmed their initial 
prediction (those who predicted conformity first time conformed and then received the 
information that most of other players had conformed),  so that there was no reason to make a 
change in their beliefs.   
4. Indentifying the players with conformist preferences 
The  most interesting fact emerging from these data is the significat change from a situation in 
which most players chose a strategy compatible with the pursuit of their self interest, asking 
for half of the sum for themselves and leaving nothing for the third player, to a situation in 
which there was a significant growth in the propensity to choose an equal division by 
implementing a widely shared  rule of equal distribution of the benefits.  This shift becomes 
particularly clear  if, considering only the 60 subjects with an active role in the third phase,  
we look at the behaviour of the 51 of them  (85%) that asked for 6 euros in at least one of  the 
rounds of the first phase, so taking a decision that cannot dsicriminate between  the two self-
interest and conformistic preferences hypotheses (Figure 9). Indeed, we can observe that 31 of 
them chose the (33%, 33%, 33%) rule in the second phase, 19 of these implemented it in the 
third phase, with 17 believing that their opponents would do the same.  Eight of the remaining 
11 subjects who decided to ask for the maximum amount did not believe that their opponents 
would implement the rule. 
17 of the 18 players who agreed on the (50%, 50%, 0) rule implemented it expecting the same 
behaviour by their opponents. 
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Following the choices of this class of subjects through the three phases of the experiment,  we 
can conclude that at least 16 of them (one third  of all the active players who asked for 6 euros 
in at least one of  the rounds of the first phase)  made choices that can be considered perfectly 
compatible with our hypotheses (boxes with thick borders in figure 9). Indeed, the change in 
their behaviour from phase 1 to phase 2 can be attributed to the activation of conformist 
motives due to the introduction of a shared non-binding rule of division and to the emergence 
of beliefs about reciprocal conformity. 
In addition, 8 of the 12 (11 in the second round) players that decided not to implement the 
33%, 33%, 33% rule did so believing that the counterpart would do the same.  
This last observation does not conflict with the conformist preferences hypothesis. However, 
because it is also compatible with the assumption that players are characterized by self-
interest, it does not allow us to identify pure-conformist players.  The same can be said with 
regard to the 15 players who decided to implement the ( 50%, 50%, 0) rule expecting the 
same behaviour by their opponents (boxes with dotted borders in figure 9).  
51 (85%)  
chose to ask for  ‘6’ in at least one of the two rounds of the first phase 
31 chose rule 33%-33%-33% 
19 implemented it 
17  expect ed the 
same behavior from 
the opponent 
18 implement ed it 
16 expected the same 
behavior from the 
opponent 
12 do not implement ed it Phase III (1st time) 
Phase II  
Phase I  
Phase III (2nd time) 
8  expect ed the same 
behavior from the 
opponent 
11 did not implement it 
8  expected the same 
behavior from the 
opponent 
19 chose rule 50%-50%-0 
18 implemented it 1 do not implement ed it 
15  expect ed the 
same behavior from 
the opponent 
1  expect ed a 
different behavior 
from the opponent 
18 implemented it 1 do not implement ed it 
15  expect ed the 
same behavior from 
the opponent 
1  expect ed different 
behavior from the 
opponent 
Figure 9: The  choices of players who chose to ask for ‘6’ at least once in the first phase 
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5. Conclusions 
We can summarize our results by saying that at least one third of the players who were always 
active behaved and asked for 6 euros in at least one of  the rounds of the first phase were 
motivated by conformist preferences, while the remaining subjects can be identified as being 
either self-interested or conformist. Only four players displayed behavior compatible with the  
inequity-averse hypothesis. In particular, with respect to our empirical predictions: 
i)  The observation that most players chose strategy ‘6’ in both the rounds of the first 
phase is compatible with prediction 1. 
ii) The fact that, in the second phase, a large number of players agreed on the  (33%, 
33%, 33%) rule is compatible with  predictions 2.  
iii) For a significant number of subjects, having agreed on a rule seems to have been 
sufficient reason to generate expectations about reciprocal conformity.16 
iv)  There is a close correlation between a player’s belief about the opponent’s 
willingness to conform with the rule and his decision to implement it (prediction 
3). 
v) A significant number  of those players who egoistically chose strategy ‘6’ in at 
least one of the rounds of the first phase and who agreed on the rule of equal 
division in phase two, decided to implement the rule in phase three; and these are 
definitely most of those who, having acted as just described, entertained the  belief 
that the agreed rule would have been played by their counterpart; all this is in 
accordance with prediction 4.  
vi) Information that confirms beliefs about conformity does not change the 
willingness to conform,  in accordance with prediction 5.  
 
These results allow us concluding that the  experimental evidence backs the Sacconi and 
Grimalda’s model of choice based on conformist preferences and comprehensive utility 
functions. The significant shift in the behaviour of the players in the transition from phase one 
to phase three is strictly consistent with the hypothesis that, having these subject realised that 
the constitutional nature of the choice in phase two asked for a fairness principle of conduct 
incompatible with their behaviour in phase 1, the very fact of having agreed on that principle 
                                                 
16
 This hypothesis is supported by the replies to the questionnaire. 
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activated their conformist motivation to conform with it, granted that they believed that the 
same principle was conformed by the counterparties. Notice that, whereas the players 
changing their behaviour crucially corroborate  the theory, also most of  players that exhibit 
the same behaviour in phase one and three (given their choice in phase two and their beliefs), 
are consistent with the theory (i.e. do not provide any anomaly to the model). This cannot be 
said for the concurrent models we considered, which cannot explain our data.  With regard to 
these alternative theories, in fact, we can conclude that: 
a) Models of inequity-aversion fail to explain the observation of different behaviours in phase 
one and in phase three by the same subjects. Why should the subjects be inequity averse in the 
third phase if they were not so motivated in the first? This finding may be explained within 
the  “inequity –aversion” framework by saying that the introduction of phase two, modelled 
as a constitutional choice, induced a change in the definition of the reference group, inducing 
subjects that in the first phase did not consider the payoff of the dummy as relevant to include 
it instead in the third phase. However, this explanation would make the inequity-aversion 
approach closely akin to the conformist preference model, where players that consider the 
advantage connected to the constitution of a social union (that is, the advantage of being 
allowed to play the game because of  agreement on a rule) develop the motivational basis for 
a change in their behaviour (but consider that we found that players’ action also depended on 
their beliefs concerning the reciprocity of the counterpart,  an aspect that does not have any 
significant role in the inequity-aversion  model). 
b) ‘Direct reciprocity’ models, or reciprocity models based on ‘direct kindness’, fail to predict 
the dramatic change in the behaviour pattern shown by subjects between the first phase, when 
it in fact accords with the direct kindness prediction, to the third one, when it diverges 
substantially. Note that dummy players did not change their status during the process that 
took the player from phase one to phase three, i.e. at the last step there were still dummy 
players, and they could not manifest direct attitude or intention toward the active players since 
they simply do not make decisions. Nevertheless, having a rule in mind, one that has been 
agreed even if not binding or exogenously enforced, seems to be enough to change the 
players’ behaviour significantly. This suggests that some sort of commitment to the principle 
itself, and beliefs concerning reciprocal conformity with it, has motivational effects.  Quite 
paradoxically, in the situation under experimentation ‘fairness’, understood according to  
Rabin model as direct reciprocity between the two active players, would imply to discriminate 
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against the weak player, and would result in a behaviour completely indistinguishable from 
the conduct that shares all the pie amongst the strong players. Players who are fair according 
to our model act against ‘fairness’ in Rabin’s sense, and should elicit a punitive response by 
the other payers if Rabin’s model were true. On the contrary our explanation accounts for 
these behaviours in terms of a desire - grounded on what can be seen as a reciprocal ‘sense of 
justice’ - for conformity to an impartial principle of fairness agreed under a veil of ignorance, 
what is much more coherent to the notion of justice given in normative economics and 
political philosophy (Rawls, 1971).  
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Appendix 1. The Psychological Nash Equilibrium ++ 
 
At the basis of this concept of solution is the idea that, in equilibrium, rational players’ beliefs 
must be coherent with their strategies. For example, if in equilibrium player i observes that j 
plays the strategy jj Σ∈σ , then i ‘s 1st order belief must assign probability 1 to the fact that j 
plays that strategy with probability 1, and 0 to the other strategies. Furthermore, given the 
equilibrium strategy iσ  of player i, and given the usual assumption of common knowledge of 
players’ rationality , i must expect  j to have the same rational beliefs, coherently with the fact 
that i plays iσ with probability 1. This means that i ‘s 2nd order beliefs must assign probability 
1 to the fact that j believes that i plays iσ . More generally, in equilibrium, all the 1st order 
beliefs must be single-point distributions assigning probability 1 to the equilibrium strategy. 
The higher order beliefs must be consistent with this condition and with the assumption of 
common knowledge of players’ rationality (Geneakoplos et al., 1989:64). Let us call ( )σβi  the 
distribution of beliefs that satisfy this coherence condition over σ  and 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) βσβσβσβ ∈= n,...,1 the profile of such beliefs for the n players. 
Recalling the definition of ib as the vector of beliefs of each order for player i, and of 
( )nbbb ,...,1=  as the profile of beliefs for each of the n players, we can define the Psychological 
Nash Equilibrium (Geneakoplos et al., 1989:65): 
A Psychological Nash Equilibrium for n-player normal form game is a pair ( ) Σ×∈ βσˆ,ˆb  such 
that: 
i) ( )σβ ˆˆ =b  
ii) for each Ii ∈ and ii Σ∈σ , ( )( ) ( )iiiiiii bVbV σσσ ˆ,ˆ,,ˆ ≤− . 
 
Condition (ii) is a restatement of the standard Nash equilibrium condition affirming that the 
equilibrium strategy must assign a payoff no smaller than the ones attained by any other 
feasible strategy, given the opponent’s strategy and the beliefs. Condition (i) requires the 
beliefs to be coherent with the equilibrium strategy. Note that if beliefs are not part of the 
                                                 
++
 This appendix draws on Sacconi and Grimalda (2003) 
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utility function then condition (i) becomes redundant and the definition boils down to the 
standard Nash equilibrium definition. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Voting Procedure 
 
Subjects were randomly assigned to five groups with three members (identified with the 
numbers from 1 to 5). Each member could read the number of his group on his computer 
screen but could not interact with the other members, nor identify them. 
The experimenter distributed a form like the one in figure 1a 
 
 
Figure 1a: Form for the general principle selection 
 
 
 
The subjects were asked to fill in the “ ID ” and “Group’s number” box and to select their 
preferred principle by ticking one of the two boxes in the “Player’s choice” column. The 
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experimenters collected the forms and checked the votes, writing on each player’s form the 
choices of the other members of the group. If the members of some groups did not reach 
unanimous agreement, the experimenter again distributed the forms to all the subjects.17 
Members of the groups that did not reach agreement were asked to vote again, while the 
others had to wait. The experimenter collected the forms, checked the votes and repeated the 
same procedure until all the groups had reached agreement. The maximum number of trials 
allowed was five. 
After the voting for selection of the general principle new forms like the ones in figures 2a 
and 3a were distributed. These stated particular division rules deduced from the general 
principle. Each subject received a form stating the rules deduced from the principle selected in 
the previous stage. The voting procedure was the same as the one adopted for the principles 
selections, but the maximum number of trials was now ten. 
      
Figure 2a: Form for the selection of rule deduced 
from principle 1 
Figure 3a: Form for the selection of rule 
deduced from principle 2 
 
 
                                                 
17
 This made it impossible to identify the members of a particolar group exploiting the information about the 
outcome of the voting procedure. 
 35 
 
 
At the end of the voting procedure, the experimenter? inserted the rule selected in a form that 
appeared on the screen of each subject.  
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Appendix 3. Experimental results 
 
ID G1 G2 1^ ROUND 2^ ROUND RULE 1^ ROUND 2^ ROUND 1^ ROUND 2^ ROUND
1 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
2 4,00 3,00 33-33-33
3 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
4 6,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
5 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
6 6,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
7 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
8 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
9 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
10 4,00 3,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
11 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
12 6,00 6,00 50-50-0
13 4,00 6,00 33-33-33
14 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
15 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
16 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
17 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
18 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
19 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
20 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
21 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 63 63
22 4,00 6,00 33-33-33
23 4,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 50-50-0 NO NO 46 46
24 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
25 4,00 3,00 33-33-33 0 0
26 4,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
27 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
28 6,00 6,00 4,00 6,00 33-33-33 YES NO 44 46
29 4,00 6,00 33-33-33
30 4,00 6,00 50-50-0
31 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
32 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 63 63
33 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
34 6,00 4,00 33-33-33
35 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
36 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
37 3,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
38 4,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
39 6,00 6,00 50-50-0
40 4,00 3,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
41 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
42 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 46 46
43 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
44 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
45 4,00 4,00 33-33-33
46 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
47 6,00 4,00 33-33-33
48 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
49 6,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
50 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
51 6,00 4,00 6,00 4,00 33-33-33 NO YES 64 44
52 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
53 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
54 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
55 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 66 66
56 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
57 6,00 4,00 33-33-33
58 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
59 6,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 63 66
60 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 0 0
61 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 0 0
62 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
63 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 46 46
64 4,00 6,00 50-50-0
65 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 63 63
66 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
67 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
68 6,00 6,00 50-50-0
69 6,00 4,00 50-50-0
70 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
71 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
72 6,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
73 6,00 6,00 50-50-0
74 4,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
75 6,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
76 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 33-33-33 NO NO 63 63
77 6,00 6,00 50-50-0
78 6,00 4,00 6,00 6,00 50-33-17 YES YES 64 66
79 4,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
80 6,00 6,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
81 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
82 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
83 4,00 4,00 33-33-33
84 6,00 6,00 6,00 4,00 50-33-17 NO YES 66 64
85 6,00 6,00 33-33-33
86 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
87 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 50-50-0 YES YES 66 66
88 6,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 33-33-33 YES YES 44 44
89 6,00 6,00 50-33-17
90 4,00 6,00 50-50-0
PHASE I (1) PHASE 3 IMPLEMENTATION PREDICTION (2)
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(2) The first number corresponds to the strategy of the first player, the second number to the strategy of the second player. Thus 66 means that the player, that plausibly 
has choosen the stratefy 6, expect the same choice by his counterpart.
(1) In phase 1 each subject plays under both the two roles (G1 and G2); the grey raws refer to player that do not have an active role in phase 3
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Appendix 4. The questionnaire. 
 
1) What strategy did you choose in phase one?  
 
As G1…………… ; As G2……………… 
 
 Could you describe the reasons for these choices? 
 
2) On what rule did you reach agreement in the second phase? To what extent do you 
agree with? this rule? 
 
3) What were your expectations about the willingness of the other player to apply the 
rule in the third phase (Or the G1 and G2 willingness if your role was G3) ? 
 
 
 
4) What have been the main differences between the first and the third phase? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
